illustrates about the role of opposition within the Rus sian party system. Does it indicate greater pluralistic potential or merely a greater imitation of it? What does Just Russia reveal about the way the Kremlin "manages" opposition and its success in doing so? Third, to re flect on the role of opposition parties in "electoral authoritarian" regimes: how are they manipulated or even manufactured; how much "opposition" can they even profess?
The answer to these questions will show that both optimists and pessi mists are partly right. Certainly, Just Russia can be understood as a regime created "parastatal party" aimed at providing limited competition for the main "party of power" (United Russia). Contrary to the most skeptical 5. Robert Alan Dahl, ed., Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (New Haven, 1966 ). 6 . "Just Russia" is preferred to some other translations (e.g., "AJust Russia," "Russia of Justice") by analogy to "United Russia" and to others (e.g., "Fair Russia") because its slogan "social justice" is a recognized, if disputed, left-wing term.
7. Vladimir Pribylovskii, quoted in Nabi Abdullaev, "New Party Says Kremlin Knows Of course, the Russian authorities' managerial efforts are not con fined to the party of power, and this is increasingly reflected in Russia watchers' conceptualizations of the party system as a whole. For example, Henry Hale identifies "ideocratic" (single-issue and protest parties), pro grammatic parties (with consistent, identifiable ideologies), and "clien telistic parties" including the parties of power.30 Richard Sakwa identifies a similar constellation, although tilted somewhat more toward pro-regime parties: "programmatic parties" (with a clear ideology adopted by intra party democracy), "project parties" set up soon before elections as some short-term elite machination, and "regime parties," including the party of power, "established to manipulate and shape political space."31 Such char acterizations are useful as parsimonious general ideal-types but do not get us especially far with understanding particular parties such as Just Russia (which has program, project, and regime/clientelistic elements).
Hans Oversloot
and Ruben Verheul focus more explicitly on pro regime parties and provide some relevant typologies for our study here:
the "adjunct/alternative party of power," which is ideologically identical to a "party of power" but designed as a sparring partner to keep the elite on its toes and test new personnel, and a "favored opposition party" (parties such as Rodina in 2003 that are "professional double crossers and fakers" who channel opposition to support the elite).32 These typologies provide a range of elite options that makes Mexico and Nigeria's parastatal parties look amateurish, but they remain static, with little attempt to analyze the dynamic interaction between regime parties. The most significant such at tempt is undoubtedly Andrew Wilson's concept "virtual politics."33 Wilson argues that the Leninist "culture of deceit" with its "organized victories," fake plebiscites, and satellite parties infiltrated by double agents has led to a falsification of the entire electoral process whereby parties (and poli tics in general) are manipulated by the elite to monopolize power and the competition for it.34 The aim of the elite is simultaneously to avoid real politics and to mimic it, a process in which "designer parties" play a great role.
Wilson's approach can be criticized: it assumes that post-Soviet politi cal culture is, sui generis, ignoring instances of manipulation practiced elsewhere;
it assumes a greater degree of coordination and control than the Kremlin has managed (especially in the El'tsin era), and (as shown above) the degree to which a limited amount of genuine "healthy com petition" is necessary for regime survival. Moreover, it can give too much credence to unverifiable rumor.35 Nevertheless, the approach is illuminat ing. Wilson does not argue that all politics is faked but that it is multidi mensional.36 Indeed, even the mimicry of public politics is itself deeply political?"virtuality" indicates that the political stakes are extremely high. Leninist practice of kto-kogo ("who beats whom") is echoed in the emphasis on ends justifying means and the elite's unscrupulousness in deliberately blurring the distinction between real and fake in the service of a genuine political contest.37
Virtual politics is of great utility in understanding the origins and evo lution of Just Russia, in particular its multidimensionality and how real and virtual are combined.
The party is not simply a Potemkin party. On one level it is a left-wing social democratic programmatic party appealing to paternalist voter sentiment; on another, an "alternative party of power" designed to spar with the elite while representing a careerist project for elements of that elite; on yet another it is a "project /favored opposition party" designed to marginalize more independent opposition (particu larly the communists).
During its short life to date, the party has vacillated between these three facets and this explains why it has arguably failed to achieve any of its principal aims. Just Russia pitched itself as a catch-all socialist rather than social democratic party, while still using slogans such as "New socialism, social democracy and humanism," "Socialism 3.0," and even the "third way."70 Party documenta tion was replete with leftist terms like solidarity, socialjustice, even exploitation.
The party also offered a more radically redistributionist (even revanchist) profile than modern social democracy, rejecting the idea of "equality of op portunities." It proposed progressive taxation alongside windfall taxes on luxury goods and profits from 1990s privatizations and suggested using the Stabilization Fund to redistribute private companies' super-profits, raise pensions, and subsidize social utilities and welfare.71 The party promised a market economy but not a market society and pledged to combat large scale capital.72 Its radical image was reinforced by the tendency of the press to refer to its members as the "Esery" (SRs), implying continuity with the prewar left-populist Socialist Revolutionaries.
Just Russia was also strongly populist, both in the sense of "cheap" promises to all and sundry, and in its marked anti-establishment ethos, which was directed at the corruption and bureaucratism of local elite and Although Just Russia has continually denied that it is in any way the re gime's "sparring partner," it has already become obvious that its "regime" and "project" facets are of more importance than its "programmatic" el ements. The question was not whether this was a party of power but of "how much power"? How able was it to challenge United Russia's near monopoly, and how able was its pseudo-opposition stance of becoming a real opposition?
In the March 2007 regional elections, Just Russia threatened to be come just such a real opposition.
It finished among the top three in 12 out of 14 regions, came in third in 6, second in 5, and first in 1 (Stavropol'), gaining 15.53 percent of the party list vote and 11.7 percent of seats, a nar row third to the communists (see 
